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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article discusses the interpretation of Article 25' of the United
Nations Charter that was offered by the International Court of Justice in its
advisory opinion of June 21, 1971 (Namibia Opinion).2 It is a topic that is
unfortunately overlooked by the current arguments concerning the power
of the revived Security Council. The end of the Cold War has liberated
the United Nations from the confrontation between the West and the East,
and has freed the Security Council from the functional paralysis that the
veto power of its permanent members had forced upon it. The activities
Research Associate, University of Tokyo; Ph.D. Candidate in Law, University of
Tokyo, Graudate School of Law and Politics; LL.M., 1996, Georgetown University Law Center;
LL.M., 1994, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Law and Politics; LL.B., 1992,
University of Tokyo, Faculty of Law; Netherlands Certificate in Public International Law, 1994
and 1996, Hague Academy of International Law.
1. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter provides, "[T]he members of the United
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with
the present Charter." U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
2. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16
(Advisory Opinion of June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Opinion].
*
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of the revitalized Security Council, which have been activated not only
quantitatively but also qualitatively,' have pushed the question of the
limitations on the Council's power under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter into "the forefront of attention"4 of international lawyers.
While numerous articles have discussed this question from various points
of view, 5 little attention has been given to the interpretation of Article 25
of the Charter.
II.

NAMIBIA OPINION, ARTICLE 25, AND THE POWER OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

In the Namibia Opinion6 the International Court of Justice stated
that in addition to the powers specifically granted to the Security Council
in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII, which are enumerated in Article 24,
paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter, the Council has general
implied powers in paragraph 17 of the same Article, stemming from its

3. BOUTROS BOuTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 7-12 (ed. 1995).
4. T.D. Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security
Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 26 NETH. Y.B.
INT'L L. 34 (1995).
5. E.g., LE DtVELOPPEMENT DU R6LE DU CONSEIL DE StCURITIt (Ren~e-Jean Dupuy
ed., 1993); Giorgio Gaja, Reflexions sur le r6le du Conseil de Sgcuritg dans le nouvel ordre
mondial, 97 REv. GlN. D. INT'L PUB. 297-320 (1993); Thomas M. Franck, The Powers of
Appreciation: Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality? 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519-23 (1992);
Vera Gowiland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility,
43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55-98 (1994); Martti Koskeniemmi, The Police in the Temple, 6 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 325-48 (1995); R. Lavalle, The Law of the United Nations and the Use of Force,
Under the Relevant Security Council Resolutions of 1990 and 1991, To Resolve the Persian Gulf
Crisis, 23 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3-65 (1992); Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf
Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452-73 (1991); Gill, supra note 4, at 33-138.
6. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16. The confrontation between the United Nations and
South Africa concerning the Mandates of Namibia (South West Africa) has occurred since the
establishment of the United Nations. The International Court of Justice gave some decisions and
advisory opinions regarding the conflict. See Ernst Klein, South West Africa/Namibia (Advisory
Opinions and Judgments), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 260-70 (R.
Bernhardt ed., 1981). The Security Council, on January 30, 1970, adopted resolution 276 and
declared that "the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal, and
that consequently all acts taken by the Government of South Africa, on behalf of or concerning
Namibia after the termination of the Mandate, are illegal and invalid." The Situation in Nambia,
S/RES/276 (1970) S.C. Res. 276 (1970). Moreover, the Council called upon all States "to
refrain from any dealings with the Government of South Africa." Id. Since South Africa,
nevertheless, did not withdraw from Namibia and did not alter her policy concerning it, the
Security Council requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on
Legal Consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). The Situation in Nambia,
S/RES/284 (1970) S.C. Res. 284 (1970).
7. Article 24, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the United Nations Charter provides,
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responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.' In support
of this position the Court cited the Secretary General's statement of
January 10, 1947, which was submitted to the Security Council. That
statement pronounced that
[t]he powers of the Council, under Article 24, are not
restricted to the specific grants of authority contained in
Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XI. 9 The Members of the
United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council
powers commensurate with its responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and security. The only limitations
are the fundamental principles and purposes found in
Chapter I of the Charter."
Furthermore, the Court stated that Article 25, which provides
decisions of the Security Council with legal binding effect upon Member
States," applied not only to decisions taken under Chapter VII but also to
those taken under the general implied powers.' 2 In other words, the Court
admitted that the Security Council had general mandatory powers, which
are implied from its responsibility to maintain international peace and

1.

2.

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf.
In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers
granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid
down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

U.N. CHARTER art. 24., paras. 2-3.

8. This is theoretically justified by implied powers doctrine, according to which
international organizations can deduce powers necessary for discharging their objects from their
duties when such powers are not explicitly provided in the constituent documents. See, e.g.,
Manfred Zuleeg, International Organizations, Implied Powers, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 312 (1984); Manuel Rama-Montaldo, InternationalLegal Personalityand
Implied Powers of International Organizations, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 111-55 (1970). The
International Court of Justice has admitted this doctrine. For example, in the Reparation Case, it

stated, "[T]he rights and duties of an entity such as the [United Nations] Organization must
depend upon its purpose and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and
developed in practice." Reparation for Injuries, 1949 I.C.J. 180 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11)
(emphasis added).
9. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 52.
10. Id.
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
12. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 52-54.
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security.' 3 Those general implied powers give the Security Council the
authority to impose any obligation upon Member States, so long as the
Council acted for such purposes.
Little attention has been paid to the Namibia Opinion in this
context. Instead, current arguments only focus on what the Security
Council can decide under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The
Security Council increased mandatory sanctions after the end of the Cold
War.' 4 These mandatory sanctions have been justified "under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter.'
This justification precludes an argument
proposing that Article 25 applies to the Council's decisions. Thus, it has
been found unnecessary to discuss what decisions can be made outside
Chapter VII with legal binding effect.
However, if the interpretation of Articles 24 and 25 offered by the
International Court of Justice is accepted, current arguments concerning
the limitations on the Security Council's exercise of authority under
Chapter VII would become futile. An action taken pursuant to the
Council's direction could be vindicated by its general mandatory powers
even if one could contend that the Council's action could not be justified
by its power under Chapter VII.
Arguments concerning the Lockerbie Incident provide a good
example of this point. Three years after the explosion of Pan American
Flight 103, on December 21, 1988, the Security Council adopted
resolution 748 (1992), which determined that "the failure by the Libyan
Government . . . to respond fully and effectively to the requests in
resolution 731 (1992) constitute[d] a threat to international peace and
security" 6 and decided that, "[a]cting under Chapter VII, . . .the Libyan
Government must now comply without any further delay with .
resolution 731 (1992) regarding the requests" for extradition of the alleged
suspects of Libyan nationality."' Although this incident has raised
animated arguments coricerning the limitations of the Council's power
under Chapter VII and the justiciability of the Council's activities, 8 very
13. UN SCOR, 3d Sess., 91 mtg. at 45. (1947).
14. There were seven sanction regimes imposed by the Council as of December 16, 1994,
although there was only one as of January 31, 1988. See BOUTROS-GHALI,
15.

npr"note
3, at 8.

E.g., S.C. Res. 661 (1990), S.C. Res. 670 (1990), HumanitarianAssistance S.C. Res.

687 (1991); S.C. Res. 778 (1992) (against Iraq); Yugoslavia Situation S.C. Res. 713 (1991);
S.C. Res. 820 (1993) (against Former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 733 (1992) (against Somalia); Air
and Arms Embargo S.C. Res. 748 (1992) (against Libya); S.C. Res. 788 (1992) (against

Liberia); S.C. Res. 841 (1993) (against Haiti).
16. S.C. Res. 748 (1992) S/RES/748 (1992).
17.

Id.

18. Bernard Graefrath, Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court, the Libyan Case, 4
EUR. J. INT'L L. 184-205 (1993); Mark Weller, The Lockerbie Case: A PrematureEnd to the
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few of these arguments pay attention to the issue of general mandatory
powers of the Security Council. 9 Most fail to recognize that the general
mandatory powers would justify the Council's sanction on Libya, even if
any limitations of the power under Chapter VII exist.
Among the few scholars who have discussed the relationship
between the Council's general mandatory powers and its power under
Chapter VII, three standpoints emerge. Professor Bothe contests the
interpretation of Article 24 offered by the International Court of Justice.
He contends that the predominance of the great powers in the system of
international peace and security is legitimated by the fact that the power of
the Council is defined very strictly, that is, the Council has only specific
powers as defined by Article 24, paragraph 2.20 Since Bothe denies the
existence of the general implied powers of the Security Council, naturally
he would also deny the Council's general mandatory powers, which are
premised upon the existence of the general implied powers. Professor Gill
basically accepts the interpretation of the International Court of Justice but
contends that, where the Council's authority is defined by specific
provisions in the Charter, the Council's general powers "should not be
construed in such a way as to violate or exceed the allocation and
21
limitation of authority contained in specific provisions of the Charter."
Professor White definitely supports the position of the Court22 and
contends that the current Security Council resolutions imposing mandatory
sanctions should be adopted under "the Council's general mandatory
powers, as identified by the World Court in the Namibia [sic] case rather

than under Chapter VII. "23
None of these views are satisfactory. First, Professor Bothe's
perspective neglects the fact that the general implied powers of the
Security Council are widely accepted by the international community.24
Second, Professor Gill's view is inconsistent because the Security
Council's powers cannot be limited to those things specifically listed in the
New World Order?, 4 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 302-24 (1992); Manfred Mohr, Der LockerbieFall vor UN-Sicherheitratund Jnternationalem Gerichtshof, 20 DEMOKRATIE UND RECHT 305-14

(1992); C. Tomuschat, The Lockerbie Case before the International Court of Justice, 48 THE
REVIEW 38-48 (1992); Gerald McGinley, The ICJ's Decision in the Lockerbie Cases, 22 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 577-607 (1992); Franck, supra note 5, at 519-23.
19.

See Bothe, Les limites des pouvoirs du Conseil de Sgcuritg, in LE DtVELOPPEMENT DU

ROLE DU CONSEIL DE StCURITI, supra note 5, at 70-71.

20. Id.
21.

Gill, supra note 4, at 70.

22.

N.D. WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE 61-66 (1993) (emphasis added).

23. Id. at 66.
24.

LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY

AND DOCUMENTS 204-07 (3d & revised ed. 1969).
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chapters granting its powers and at the same time be expanded to include
implied powers.
Moreover, both Professors Gill and White do not examine the
validity of the Court's interpretation. Both of them premise the Court's
interpretation without questioning it.
The advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice is not binding, and even the decision of the
Court has no precedential value in a strict sense. 25 This means that the
Court's opinion can be relied upon only when it is in accordance with
existing international law. 26 Thus, study on the Court's interpretation is
essential in discussing the relationship between the Council's general
mandatory powers and its power under Chapter VII.
In discussing whether the majority of the International Court of
Justice validly interpreted Article 25 of the Charter, this article examines
whether the Court's own reasoning is sustainable (Section II); whether the
Court's opinion can be supported by certain other doctrines (Section III);
and finally, whether the Court's interpretation has been accepted by the
Member States of the United Nations (Section IV).
III.

MAJORITY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The majority opinion of the International Court of Justice in the
Namibia Opinion explores two premises in determining whether Security
Council resolution 276 (1970) is mandatory. 7 First, the Court examines
the legal basis of the resolution and, second, the binding effect of the
decision.28 That is to say, the Court distinguishes the legal basis for
adopting such a resolution from the legal effect that the resolution may
have. This distinction should be noted. As for the legal basis of the
resolution, the Court relies upon the general implied powers of the
Council. This is necessary for discharging the responsibility of maintaining
international peace and security, which is vested in the Council under
Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter.2 9 As to the legal effect of the
resolution, or in other words, what makes the implied powers mandatory,
the Court contends that Article 25 not only applies to enforcement
measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter but also to the
25. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59. However, it is usual for the
International Court of Justice to follow its preceding judgments and opinions.
26. Judicial decisions shall be applied by the International Court of Justice "as subsidiary
means for the determination of rule of law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, art.
38, para. I(d) (emphasis added).
27. Strictly, the Court admits the mandatory nature of paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Security
Council resolution. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 52.
28. See id. at 51-54.
29. See id. at 52.
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decisions of the Security Council adopted in accordance with the general
implied powers.30
It is true, as mentioned above, that the Security Council's general
implied powers regarding Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter have
been generally accepted. However, this does not necessarily mean that the
Security Council can take any type of action, even though this means that
it can act upon any appropriate occasion.3 ' That is, even though the
general implied powers empower the Security Council to act in any
appropriate occasion, this does not necessarily mean that, on such
occasion, it can issue binding decisions directly based upon such general
powers. This is the reason why the majority opinion explores two
premises in reasoning that the Security Council has general mandatory
powers. Since the majority's first premise is generally accepted, the
second premise is the focus of this paper. That is, the focus of this paper
is to discuss whether Article 25 applies to those decisions of the Security
Council which are adopted in accordance with the general implied powers
under Article 24, paragraph 1.
The reasoning of the majority on this point is rather simple. The
Court shows a strong presumption that the declarations made under Article
24 would bind all the Member States, rejects two refutations of the
presumption, and, consequently concludes the legal binding effect of
resolution 276.32
First of all, a strong assumption is granted to the legal binding
effect of resolution 276 which is adopted in accordance with the general
implied powers without showing any grounds but by stating that
[ilt would be an untenable interpretation to maintain that,
once such a declaration had been made by the Security
Council under Article 24 of the Charter, on behalf of all
member States, those Members would be free to act in
disregard of such illegality or even to recognize violations
of law resulting from it. When confronted with such an
internationally unlawful situation, Members of the United
Nations would be expected to act in consequence of the
33
declaration made on their behalf.
Second, the Court rejects the contention "that Article 25 of the
Charter applies only to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII

30.

See id. at 52-53.

31.

See id. at 293 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).

32. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 52.
33.

Id. at 52.
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of the Charter"34 for the following reasons: (a) no words define "the
decisions of the Security Council" in Article 25, as those merely in regard
to enforcement action under Chapter VII, and the only words confining
such decisions are "in accordance with the Charter;" 3" (b) Article 25 is
placed not in Chapter VII but in Chapter V, which deals with the functions
and powers of the Security Council in general; 36 and, finally, (c) Article
25 would be unnecessary if it only related to decisions regarding
enforcement actions under Chapter VII, since Articles 48 and 49 provide
binding effect for such decisions.37
Furthermore, the Court refutes the contention that resolution 276
does not purport to impose any legal duty upon the Member States as it is
couched in exhortatory language, on the grounds that i) "the terms of the
resolution to be interpreted," ii) "the discussions leading to it," iii) "the
Charter provisions invoked," and iv) "in general, all circumstances that
might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution" have
to be taken into account to determine the binding effect of the Security
Council resolution. 3' That is, the decisive factor is not the language used
in the resolution, but the Council's intention, which can be inferred from
"all circumstances. 39
Two issues should be separated in examining the Court's
reasoning. The first issue is whether this reasoning is sufficient to refute
the contention that Article 25 applies only to enforcement measures
adopted under Chapter VII. The second issue is whether the reasoning is
adequate enough to prove that Article 25 applies to any decisions adopted
in accordance with the general implied powers of the Security Council.
The Court's reasoning as to the first issue is convincing. Article 25 would
be unnecessary if it only relates to decisions regarding enforcement actions
under Chapter VII. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that
Article 25 applies to any decisions based upon the Council's general
implied powers. In other words, negating the view that Article 25 applies
only to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII does not
necessarily refute the contention that Article 25 applies only to decisions
adopted in accordance with specific provisions in the Charter, including
Articles other than Chapter VII, such as Article 34 and Article 94,
paragraph 2.

34. Id. at 52-53.
35. Id. at 53.
36. See id.
37.

See id. at 54.

38.

Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 54.

39

Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 52.

1997]

Mori

In light of the possibility that under Article 25 the powers of the
Security Council are limited by the specific Charter provisions, the basis
of the majority opinion of the Court becomes unstable. First, "[ilf . . .
Article [25] were automatically to make all [sic] decisions of the Security
Council binding, then the words 'in accordance with the present Charter'
would be quite superfluous."' Second, the fact that Article 25 is placed in
Chapter V of the Charter does not mean that it applies to all decisions
adopted in accordance with general implied powers. Article 25 is placed
in Chapter V as a general provision, which provides a binding effect with
decisions adopted in accordance with specific provisions including those
other than Chapter VII. Third, Articles 48 and 49 complement Article 25,
and the latter is still significant as a general provision. 4'
On the other hand, the rejection of the second refutation is not
meant to prove the legal binding effect of the resolution itself. According
to the Court's reasoning, the Security Council's intention is a decisive
factor in determining what declaration made in accordance with the
general implied powers would have legal binding effect. However, it is
only when the Council has the general mandatory powers that the
Council's intention would matter. Here, the Court presumes the Security
Council's general mandatory powers again.
. In conclusion, although the Court effectively refutes the contention
that Article 25 applies only to enforcement actions under Chapter VII, its
reasoning is not enough to prove that the Article applies to any decisions
adopted in accordance with the general implied powers of the Security
Council. It is the strong presumption that "[i]t would be an untenable
interpretation to maintain that, once such a declaration had been made by
the Security Council under Article 24 of the Charter, . . ., those Members
would be free to act in disregard of such illegality or even to recognize
violations of law resulting from it" 42 that nevertheless leads the Court to
the latter conclusion.
However, such a presumption by the Court is not shared by all.
Indeed, this view emphasizing institutional effectiveness 43 of the Security
40. Id. at. 293-94 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
41. AC Cilliers, United Nations Competence in respect of South West Africa, 2 SOUTH
AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 136-37 (1976); Von Wilhelm A. Kewenig, Die Problematik der
Bindungswirkung von Entscheidungen des Sicherheitsrates, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR U. SCHEUNER
ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 273-74 (H. Ehmske et al. eds., 1973); M. KROKEL, DIE
BINDUNGSWIRKUNG VON RESOLUTIONEN DES SICHERHEITSRATES DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN

GEGENUBER MITGLIEDSTAATEN 49 (1977); Jean Paul Jacqu6, L'Avis de la cour internationalede
justice du 21 Juin 1971, 76 REV. GtN. DROIT INT'L PUB. 1088-89 (1972).
42.

See Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 52.

43. Institutional effectiveness has been relied upon by the International Court of Justice to
provide an international organization with "those powers which, though not expressly provided
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Council is strongly criticized as making the Council's power essentially
unlimited, thus enabling the Council to impose any obligation upon
Member States against their will. 44 According to the majority opinion, the
Security Council could impose any obligation upon Member States by
asserting that it is discharging its responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, since it is easy to represent any
controversial international situation as involving a latent threat to peace
and security. 45 As Judge Gros contends, the majority opinion is "to turn
the Security Council into a world government," ' a result that is most
likely unacceptable to many of the Member States, which are part of an
community whose main actors are still independent sovereign
international
7
4

states.

In other words, the Council's emphasis on the institutional
effectiveness of the Security Council comes into conflict with state
sovereignty, which is an issue emphasized by some dissenting opinions.48
Institutional effectiveness and state sovereignty are equally crucial since
both of them relate to fundamentals of the international society. Basic
units of the international community are sovereign states, and yet, on the
other hand, the function of the Council is to maintain peace and security of
the international community. It is true that state sovereignty is somehow
limited by the establishment of the United Nations, but this does not lead
to the conclusion that institutional effectiveness always supersedes state
sovereignty. Thus, any attempt to deduce a conclusion from a certain
value is bound to be futile, for it leads to the sterile confrontation between
in the [constituent documents], are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential
to the performance of its duties." Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 182 (Apr. 9) (emphasis added).
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 690 (4th ed. 1990).

44. W. Riphagen, The Legal Consequence of Illegal Acts under Public InternationalLaw,
20 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 27, 31 (1973); Lawrence L. Herman, The Legal Status of Namibia and
of the United Nations Council for Namibia, 13 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 306, 319 (1975). Contra,
RENATA SONNENFELD RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 127-28

(1988); ROSGEN, supra note 41, at 159; Rosalyn Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia:
Which UN Resolutions Are Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter?21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
270, 286 (1972).
45.

See Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J at 294 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).

46. Id. at 340 (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros).
47. See Anthony J.M. Zuijdwijk, The International Court and South West Africa: Latest

Phase, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 332, 338-40 (1973). See also Riphagen, supra note 44, at
34; P.H. Koojimans, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 20
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 17, 24 (1973); Herman, supra note 44, at 319; Arthur W. Rovine, The
World Court Opinion on Namibia, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203, 230 (1972); Cillers,

supra note 41, at 136; Oliver J. Lissitzyn, InternationalLaw and the Advisory Opinion on
Namibia, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 50, 73 (1972).
48. See Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 294-95 dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice);
Id. at 341 (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros); Id. at 147 (separate opinion of Judge Onyeama).
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two absolute values. Therefore, apart from such axiology, a more fruitful
discussion can be had by examining how states regard the scope of binding
decisions of the Security Council .
IV. GENERAL MANDATORY POWERS DOCTRINE
This section examines whether the interpretation offered by the
majority opinion can be sustained from another perspective. Having
analyzed the reasoning of the majority opinion, this section examines the
alleged basis of the general mandatory powers doctrine, which contends
that the Security Council has general and almost unlimited powers to issue
binding decisions if it acts in maintaining international peace and security.
The alleged basis of this doctrine, other than those discussed above, are
travaux pr~paratoires (preparatory documents) of the United Nations
Charter and practices of the Security Council.
A. Travaux Prdparatoires(PreparatoryDocuments)
Some scholarss' base their contention on the fact that, at the San
Francisco Conference, an amendment proposed by Belgium was voted
down." That amendment would have required that any obligation of the
Member States, under Article 25 to carry out the Security Council's
decisions, be restricted to those decisions adopted under Chapter V111 5 2 of
the Dumbarton ProposalV3 be expressly stated. Indeed, the Secretary
General's statement reads, "[t]he rejection of this [Belgian] amendment is
clear evidence that the obligation of the Members to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council applies equally to decisions made [under
the general implied powers] under Article 24 and to the decisions made
49. See A. C. Arend, Chapter III: A Methodology for Determining an InternationalLegal
Rule, in LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
50. Koojimans, supra note 47, at 22-23; Jost Delbruck, Artikle 25, in CHARTA DER
VEREINTEN NATIONEN KOMMENTAR 376

(B. Simma ed.

1991; RAHMATULLAH KHAN, IMPLIED

POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 7 (1970). See also Higgins, supra note 44, at 278-79;
SONNENFELD, supra note 44, at 126-27.
51. The Belgian proposal was to add the words "taken under Chapter VIII" after the words
"Security Council" in paragraph 4, section B, chapter VI, which provided as follows: "All
members of the Organization should obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security
Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter." The United
Nations Dumbarton Proposals for a General International Organization, Doc.1, G/l, 3
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 9 (1945).
52. Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Proposal corresponds to Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of
the current United Nations Charter. Dumbarton Oaks Proposalsfor a General International
Organization, Doc.l, G/I. 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 12-19 (1945).
53. Id.
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under the grant of specific powers." 5 4 However, this understanding is too
simplistic and it is untenable to conclude so from this fact.
First, the Belgian proposal received a favorable vote of a majority
of the delegates that attended and voted at the meeting, despite it being
voted down due to the lack of the necessary two-thirds majority."
Moreover, the Belgian amendment was not intended to modify the text
substantially, but to make explicit that the decisions of the Security
Council, which Member States have an obligation to accept, referred
solely to its powers under Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Proposal. 6 In
addition, one of the sponsoring countries, the United Kingdom, suggested
that the amendment was not necessary, since the decisions of the Security
by the phrase, "in accordance with the provisions
Council were specified
57
Charter.
of the
Furthermore, some governmental official reports on the San
Francisco Conference support the view that the binding decisions of the
Security Council must be based upon the specific Charter provisions. For
example, the United States report on the result of the San Francisco
Conference clearly states that it is to be noted that the members of the
Organization agree to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter. Thus, the precise extent of the
members' obligation under Article 25 can be determined only by reference
to otherprovisions of the Charter, particularly Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and
XII 8 Moreover, the Canadian official commentary on the Charter
emphasizes that the view that Member States assume obligations under

54. U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., 91st mtg. at 45, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 91 (1947) [hereinafter U.N.
SCOR]. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. Pleadings, 100, n.160 (1970) (statements of the Secretary General of the United Nations).
55. The proposal received a favorable vote of 14 to 13. Summary Report of Fourteenth
Meeting of Committee, Doc. 597, III/1/30, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 395 (1945).
56. See id. at 394.
57. Id. Indeed, the British delegation suggested the Security Council can issue binding
decisions only under Chapters VIII and XII (Chapter XVII of the current Charter) of the

Dumbarton Proposal. Id. Other than these two countries, the Soviet Union argued against the
Belgian amendment because the proposal would restrict the Council's power undesirably but
Canada contended that paragraph 4 should be interpreted as relating exclusively to chapter VIII
of the Dumbarton Proposal. Id. at 394-95.

58. See The Charterof the United Nationsfor the Maintenance of InternationalPeace and
Security, Submitted by the President of the United States on July 2, 1945: Hearings on Senate,
Before the Comm'n on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1945) (report to the
President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States
delegation, the Secretary of State, June 26, 1945) (emphasis added).
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Article 25 only when other specific provisions provide so was accepted at
the Conference. 9
This analysis on travaux pr~paratoires (preparatory documents)
shows that inferring from these travaux preparatoires (preparatory
documents) that the Security Council has general mandatory powers is
invalid.' The record strongly suggests that the prevailing view was that
the binding decisions of the Security Council must be based upon the
specific provisions of the United Nations Charter.6
B. Practicesof the Security Council
Other scholars62 claim that the Security Council has general
mandatory powers, based on the analysis of several practices. However,
these practices, such as the question of the Statute of the Free Territory of
Trieste, the Palestine question, the Congo question, the Indonesian
question, the Cashmere question, the Greek frontier incidents question, the
Iranian question, and the South African question, are not relevant to the
present issue 63 and no conclusion regarding the general mandatory powers
can be drawn from these practices.'
1. The Question of the Free Territory of Trieste65
The Permanent Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste, one of the
instruments relating to the establishment of Free Territory of Trieste,
which was decided under the proposed peace treaty with Italy, provided
that the integrity and independence of the Free Territory should be assured

59. See DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, 2 REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 33 (Conference Series 1945).
60. Kewenig, supra note 41, at 274; Higgins, supra note 44, at 278; Jacqu6, supra note
41, at 1089.
61. See RUTH B. RUSSELL & JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER 665 (1958); GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 24, at 208; Kewenig, supra note
41, at 275-77.
62.

PHILIPPE MANIN, L'ORAGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES ET LE MAINTIEN DE LA

PAIX 50,

57-69 (1971); JORGE CASTAIFEDA,
RESOLUTIONS 72-75 (1969).
63.

LEGAL

EFFECTS

OF UNITED

NATIONS

Jacqud, supra note 41, at 1089-92.

64. See, e.g., GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 24, at 208; Kewenig, supra note 41, at 265;
SONNENFELD, supra note 44, at 122; A. J.P. Tammes, Decisions of International Organs as a

Source of InternationalLaw, 94 R.C.A.D.I. 299 (1958-I).
65.

See 2 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS 41-42 (1955).

134

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:121

by the Security Council.6 6 The Statute raised a discussion regarding the
authority of the Council to assume the responsibilities relating to the Free
Territory and regarding the obligations of Members of the United Nations
in consequence of. the decision by the Council to assume those
responsibilities. This case is viewed as a decisive precedent since, in this
discussion, the Secretary General of the United Nations submitted a
statement expressing the view that "the obligation of the Members to carry
out the decisions of the Security Council applies equally to decisions
[based upon the general implied powers] . . .under Article 24 and to the
decisions made under the grant of specific powers."6 7
However, this case only relates to the Security Council's general
implied powers under Article 24, not to its mandatory powers under
Article 25.68 It was not made clear as to "what countries would be bound
by the obligations to ensure the integrity and independence of the Free
Territory. , 69 Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the territory was
not under any sovereignty and that the responsibility of the Security
Council was consented to by all the signatories to the proposed Peace
Treaty. In other words, this decision "is not one where the principle of
the sovereignty of States ...is at stake." 70
2. Palestine Question
This case related to the implementation of the Plan Partition with
the Economic Union for Palestine.7' In the Plan, the General Assembly
requested the Security Council to assume responsibility for the Plan's
execution. Consequently, the question was raised whether the Council had
the power to accept such responsibility. This case is definitely irrelevant
since the Security Council rejected the Assembly's request. However,
Professor Jorge Castafieda regards this as one of the precedent-setting
cases of general mandatory powers of the Security Council.72

66.

See Permanent Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste, art. 2, 49 U.N.T.S. 187

(1950).
67. U.N. SCOR, supra note 54, at 45.
68.

See Jacqu6, supra note 41, at 1090-91.

69. U.N. SCOR, supra note 54, at 57 (statement of Australian delegation).
70. Id. at 58 (statement of French delegation).
71. See 2 REPERTORY, supra note 65, at 22-24.
72.

CASTA&IEDA, supra note 62, at 73.
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3. Congo Question, Indonesian Question, and Cashmere Question
These cases are also irrelevant to this issue. All of these related to
the resolutions, which requested a cease-fire. Thus, Article 403 of the
Charter is regarded as their authority, and, indeed, in the latter two cases a
cease-fire came into effect only after the parties concerned accepted
them.74 Therefore, these questions did not involve the issue of general
mandatory powers of the Security Council.
4. Greek Frontier Question
The issue raised in this case was whether Article 25 applied to the
decisions of the Security Council to conduct an investigation under Article
34.75 That is, the decision was not based upon the general mandatory
powers of the Security. Council but was based upon a specific provision of
the Charter, Article 34 in Chapter VI.
6. Iranian Question and South African Question
In these cases, the Security Council did not issue any binding
decisions upon Member States.
As for the Iranian question, the
controversial issue was whether the Security Council could remain seized
of the dispute even after the complaint was withdrawn by the submitting
state, Iran.76 Although the Council decided to continue the discussion on
the dispute, this decision did not impose any obligation upon Iran or any
other Member States. As to the South African question, Security Council
resolution 134 (1960), requesting South Africa to "abandon its policy of
apartheid and racial discrimination," which Professor Castafieda 77 contends
is a binding decision, was not regarded as such by the Security Council.

73. Article 40 of the Charter provides, "[in order to prevent an aggravation of the
situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable." U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
74. As for the Indonesian question, the Council indicated the Commission on Indonesia
should assist the parties in reaching agreements for cease-fire. (U.N. SCOR, 4th Sess., 421st
mtg. at 5 (1949). As to the Congo question and the Cashmere question, see Jacqud, supra note
41, at 1092.
75. See 2 REPERTORY, supra note 65, at 45. Article 34 of the Charter provides, "[t]he
Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international
friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." U.N.
CHARTER art. 34.

76.
77.

See 2 REPERTORY, supra note 65, at 19-20.
CASTAfEDA, supra note 62, at 75.
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In conclusion, none of these alleged practices of the Security
Council support the contention that Article 25 of the Charter applies to any
decisions adopted under the Council's general implied powers. In some of
these cases, no binding decision was taken and, in others, the legal basis
of the binding decision can be found in a specific Charter provisions.
V.

RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S OPINION

As indicated by the foregoing analysis, the reasoning behind the
majority opinion in the Namibia Opinion and the general mandatory
powers doctrine is untenable. Next, the responses of states to the Court's
opinion is examined to discover whether the opinion has been accepted by
the Member States of the United Nations.
Although South Africa was offended by the Court's opinion,78 the
Security Council, in resolution 301 (1971), agreed with the Court's
conclusion. However, in the resolution, the Council did not refer to the
Court's reasoning. Indeed, some Council members severely contested its
reasoning concerning Article 25 of the Charter in the discussion on the
Namibia Opinion.
The United Kingdom and France79 strongly criticized and even
denied the Court's interpretation of Article 25 of the Charter. 80 According
to both states, Article 25 only applies to the decisions under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter. The delegate of the United Kingdom
stated,
[T]his part of the majority opinion [which asserts that
certain resolutions adopted by the Security Council were
legally binding] seems . . . to be open to the most serious
legal objection . . . . And, as a matter of law, my
Government considers that the Security Council can take
decisions generally binding on Member States only when
the Security Council has made a determination under
Article 39 that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or

78.

See JOHN DUGARD, THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE 490-92 (1973).

79. Delegate of France stated, "[T]he Security Council is empowered to take decisions
binding on all States. But such decisions are limited to cases of a threat to the peace, breaches of
the peace or aggression." U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1588th mtg. at 2-3. See also U.N. SCOR,
26th Sess., 1598th mtg. at 2.
80. These two permanent members of the Security Council abstained from voting on
Resolution 301 (1971).
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act of aggression exists. Only in these circumstances are
the decisions binding under Article 25.81

Moreover, some other countries, such as Japan, 2 Italy,
Belgium, 3 and the United States,' also put up a question on the
interpretation. As the delegate of Italy clearly stated, "[T]he Court
offered a far-reaching interpretation of Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter
- an interpretation which 8is5 highly controversial and, I must say, not
shared by my Government. ,

Italy's criticism of the Court's reasoning was not necessarily in
contradiction with their agreement with the conclusion of the opinion. The
states could rely upon the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia
to accept the Court's conclusion. As in previous resolutions regarding this
issue,86 the Security Council, in the resolution 301 (1971), emphasized the
illegality of the South Africa's presence in Namibia, not referring to the
reasoning advanced by the majority opinion. Indeed, in resolution 301
(1971), the Security Council stated,
The Security Council,
Declares that South Africa's continued illegal
4.
presence in Namibia constitutes an internationally wrongful
act and a breach of international obligations and that South
Africa remains accountable to the international obligations
or the rights of the people of the Territory of Namibia;

81. U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1589th mtg. at 5-6. See also U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess.,
1598th mtg. at 3.
82. Delegate of Japan stated, "[W]e do not fully agree with all of the reasoning,
particularly with regard to some interpretations of the Charter, underlying the Court's opinion.
U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1589th mtg. at 9.
83. Delegate of Belgium stated, "[W]e feel that the Security Council can adopt decisions
mandatory for all Member States of the United Nations only when, in conformity with chapter
VII of the Charter, it has found that there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act

of aggression." U.N. SCOR. 26th Sess., 1594th mtg. at 5-6.
84. Delegate of the United States stated, "Our acceptance, of course, does not necessarily
imply approval of all the Court's reasoning. We note in this connection concern about the
Charter interpretation which has been expressed by several members of this Council." U.N.
SCOR. 26th Sess., 1598th mtg. at 3.
85. U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1589th mtg. at 11. Cf. U.N. SCOR 26th Sess., 1594th mtg.
at 4 (1971) (statement of the Liberian delegate).

86. See S.C. Res. 269 (1969), para. 4; The Situation in Nambia, S.C. Res. 276 (1970),
para.2.
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5.
Takes note with appreciation of the advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June
1971;
6.
Agrees with the Court's opinion, as expressed in
paragraph 133 of its advisory opinion:87
VI. CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War has revitalized the activities of the
Security Council and consequently activated the discussions on the issue of
the limitations on the Security Council's power under Chapter VII of the
United Nations. However, the Namibia Opinion has the potential for
ruining such arguments due to the majority opinion's contention that the
Security Council has general mandatory powers. If, as the International
Court of Justice stated, Article 24, paragraph 1, of the United Nations
Charter grants the Security Council the general implied powers and Article
25 provides a legally binding effect with decisions based upon such
general powers, the Security Council does not have to rely on Chapter VII
when it imposes sanctions.
The general mandatory powers would
empower the Council to take any action so long as it asserts that it is
acting pursuant to its responsibility to maintain international peace and
security.
Among the few scholars who have referred to the relationship
between the Security Council's general mandatory powers and its powers
under Chapter VII, even fewer have examined the validity of the Court's
interpretation in the Namibia Opinion. However, since the advisory
opinions of the International Court of Justice have no precedential value in
a strict sense, the authority of the opinion depends upon the soundness of
its reasoning. Thus, the Namibia Opinion should be fully examined from
this viewpoint.
The Court's interpretation of Article 25 of the Charter is not
sustainable. Its own reasoning is untenable. First, the Court's reasoning
does not by itself prove that Article 25 applies to any decisions based upon
the general implied powers. However, its reasoning in refuting the
contention that Article 25 only applies to enforcement measures adopted
under Chapter VII of the Charter is sound.
Second, the Court's
presumption that the Security Council has general mandatory powers leads
to the sterile confrontation between two absolute values, the institutional
effectiveness and the state sovereignty. Moreover, the reasoning behind
some other doctrines are also untenable. First, travaux pr~paratoires
87.

S.C. Res. 301 (1971).
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(preparatory documents) of the Charter do not support the conclusion that
the Security Council has general mandatory powers to the extent claimed.
Second, practices of the Security Council are irrelevant to the issue
discussed here. Furthermore, the Court's interpretation of Article 25 has
not been accepted by Member States of the United Nations, especially the
members of the Security Council.
In conclusion, the proposition that the Security Council has
general mandatory powers, as admitted by the International Court of
Justice in the Namibia Opinion, is not sustainable and, indeed, is not
accepted by states. In other words, the existence of general mandatory
powers cannot be based upon the Namibia Opinion. Since the general
mandatory powers is found untenable, limitations, on the Security
Council's power under Chapter VII, are not superseded by the general
mandatorypowers, which are essentially unlimited.
Hopefully, this analysis fills the gap in the current arguments on
the power of the Security Council. The common understanding that the
Security Council's mandatory powers could not be deduced from its
general implied powers should be the starting point of a fruitful discussion
on the limitation on the Security Council's power, thereby surmounting the
sterile debate between legalists, insisting upon state sovereignty, and hardheaded realists, insisting upon the institutional effectiveness of the United
Nations Security Council.88

88.

See Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1-38 (1996);

Koskenniemi, supra note 5, at 325-48.

